We use real estate firms to examine how asset liquidation values influence a firm's financing choice, because the productivity and quality of each asset is observable and potential measures of an asset's liquidation value are easier to ascertain ex ante. We show that compared to firms that issue equity, firms that issue debt have higher asset quality. The effect of their expected asset liquidation value is significant, even after we control for other factors that influence financing decisions. For firms whose assets' quality is not easily observable, we find that firms' financing choices depend heavily on conditions in the overall real estate market. 
equipment, PP&E). Furthermore, as Campello and Giambona (2010) point out, among the various categories of tangible assets, the real estate component of PP&E (land and buildings) has the most explanatory power over leverage.
Using prior research 1 as our starting point, we examine the variation in debt capacity relative to the determinants of liquidation value by focusing on asset quality. The potential quality of a …rm's asset includes an analysis of both tenant quality and the sustainability of the cash ‡ows associated with the asset over the business cycle rather than the potential buyers of such assets. The reason goes to the issue of value in best use, since the asset (in this case, real estate) consists of a bundle of existing and future lease contracts. Consequently, the tenant quality and the economic base of the local real estate market a¤ect whether asset sales are at prices below the value in best use. Since real estate is …xed in its location, the health of the local economy in ‡uences the cash ‡ow of the tenant and hence its decision to remain in its contract. Therefore, potential buyers face a decision on assessing the value in best use, given the quality of the asset in question relative to the desirability of the local region. This emphasis is the distinguishing feature of our study. We theoretically prove and empirically test the notion that asset quality, which we measure by tenant …nancial stability, together with the industry concentration structure of the local real estate market, determines the liquidation value of real estate and a …rm's …nancing choices. Our intrinsic measures of asset liquidation value include the industry concentration of local markets, which captures the long-term zoning ‡exibility notion of Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) and a measure of tenant …nancial stability, which re ‡ects the short-run or intermediate-term asset quality.
Our model also predicts a set of market indicators that should in ‡uence asset liquidation 1 Our work builds on earlier research that empirically tests the e¤ect of liquidation value on a …rm's capital structure choices. For example, Benmelech and Bergman (2008) , who study the U.S. airline industry and Benmelech (2009) , who examines the 19th century American railroad industry, …nd that …rms with more saleable real assets and redeployable collateral tend to have lower costs of external …nancing and longer maturities associated with debt …nancing. 3 value. In equilibrium, capital market participants should observe the intrinsic information of asset qualities and react to them accordingly. We propose two such market indicators: the realized loss severity from real estate loans (the historical measure) and the capitalization rate (a forward-looking measure). We note that the capitalization rate (cap rate), which is analogous to the inverse of the EBITDA multiple (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by enterprise value), is one of the most important market indicators in real estate (see Plazzi, Torous, and Valkanov, 2010) .
Another distinguishing feature of our study is that we use the choice of a …rm's security issuance as the dependent variable rather than using leverage ratios. By focusing on a …rm's incremental …nancing decisions, our approach deals with the persistence problem of using leverage ratios (see, e.g., Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2006) , which may yield misleading coe¢ cients (Strebulaev, 2007) .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we provide a reduced-form model of …rm liquidation value. The model helps us disentangle the intrinsic asset characteristics from the market proxy for liquidation value, which guides the empirical tests. In Section 2, we discuss four measures of asset liquidation value. In Section 3 we describe our sample and in Section 4 we test the Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesis. Section 5 concludes.
A Model of Firm Liquidation Value
A real estate …rm (REIT) operates a portfolio of commercial real estate assets, which generates a constant cash ‡ow 2 of I per unit of time until default. A default event occurs according to a Poisson process with an exogenous hazard intensity of .
Federal regulations require that REITs must hold at least 75% of its assets in real estate.
Therefore, we assume that the …rm's value equals the total value of the assets it holds.
We further assume that due to private information, geographical expertise, and reputation 2 In reality, net operating income, which is rental income net of operating expenses, may not be a constant. We provide an alternative cash ‡ow speci…cation in the Appendix. The major result remains the same. 4 developed in operating the portfolio of real assets, the current …rm is the …rst-best owner, in the sense that the real assets under current REIT management generate the highest cash ‡ows until the event of default.
In fact, the informal arguments that link the …rm's liquidation value to the best use of assets are often maintained as the following quotation from Shleifer and Vishny (1992) indicate:
"Because of credit constraints and government regulation of industry buyers, assets would have to be sold to industry outsiders who don't know how to manage them well, face agency costs of hiring specialists to run these assets properly. When industry buyers cannot buy the assets and industry outsiders face signi…cant costs of acquiring and managing the assets, assets in liquidation fetch prices below value in best use, which is the value when managed by specialists."
Formally, if it defaults, the REIT liquidates its portfolio of real assets as a whole to homogeneous second-best owners in the competitive secondary market. Over time, the new owners gradually obtain private information, develop expertise, and rebuild the reputation by managing the assets. Hence, over time, the cash ‡ow reverts to the pre-default level.
We assume that the cash ‡ow generated under the management of the second-best owner is
(1 e t ) I, where 2 (0; 1) captures the instant discount of the cash ‡ow at liquidation; measures the speed of cash ‡ow recovery to its pre-default level, and t is the length of time after default.
All market participants are risk-neutral and discount future cash ‡ows by the constant risk-free rate, r. The market value of the …rm is the sum of the present value of its cash ‡ow until default and the present value of the liquidation value upon default:
where we assume the current time is zero and denote as the time of default. E 0 ( ) is the expectation taken at time 0. V 1 is the market value of the liquidating real assets at . V 1 is the sum of the present value of the cash ‡ows under a new REIT until the next default and the present value of the liquidation value upon the next default:
where 0 denotes the time between the …rst and the second defaults. The terminal value is also V 1 because upon the second default, the homogeneous and competitive second-best owners are facing exactly the same situation as the REIT faces at the …rst default. Solving Equation (2), we get the …rm's liquidation value as:
To make the …rm's liquidation value scalable, we normalize the terminal liquidation value V 1 by its current market value V 0 . From Equation (1), we can write the current market value
Therefore the normalized liquidation value is
When we examine the determinants that a¤ect this normalized liquidation value, we …nd that the smaller the normalized liquidation value, L, the higher are the liquidation costs.
Hence, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , the less likely the real estate …rm is to …nance with debt than equity ex ante. indicators of cash ‡ow valuation will also predict the …rm's liquidation value.
Intrinsic Measures of Firm' s Liquidation Value

Tenant Quality
A higher quality of real assets implies more stable long-term cash ‡ows. In the framework of our model, the new owner will be able to recover more quickly to the optimal level (I) of cash ‡ows (larger ). Asset quality, which is intrinsic to …rm liquidation value, determines the speed of cash ‡ow recovery . It follows from Equations (3) and (5) that
Therefore, the Equation (6) predicts that asset quality has a positive e¤ect on the normalized liquidation value.
There are several ways to measure asset quality. Tax regulation requires that at least 95% of REIT gross income must come from rental income or other passive investment such as
Treasuries. Property value is de…ned as capitalized future rents, which are contracted in the properties'leases. Therefore, one way to measure cash ‡ow stability is by its lease maturities.
For example, a …rm's real assets with long-term leases should have higher quality, because future cash ‡ows are more stable for the asset owner over a long time period. However, in reality, the lease term tells only one side of the story.
Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2008) adapt the lease maturity structure as a measure of …rm liquidation value. Using a sample of equity REITs, they …nd that shorter leases are likely to have higher liquidation values because the option value of re-leasing and modifying the property at more favorable conditions to a favorable tenants. However, the lease maturity is result of bargaining between lessor and lessee and re ‡ects a balance between the cash ‡ow stability and option value. Therefore, the lease expiration structure su¤ers from an endogeneity problem as a proxy for liquidation value.
Since the lease maturity is endogenously determined, it is not an ideal proxy for asset liquidation value. We argue that tenant quality is the main driver of asset liquidation value.
Our reasoning is that there are also costs associated with long-term leases. When the longterm rent is higher than the market rent, the owner may experience lease defaults. When the long-term rent is lower than the market rent, the owner does not have the option to adjust the rent accordingly. Therefore, short-term leases give the property owner more control over property improvement, restructuring, and re…nancing ‡exibility. Furthermore, the lease term and base lease are often bundled with lease escalation, percentage rent, and lease options (lease renewal, cancellation option, expansion option, etc.). Without other contract terms such as escalation and the options mentioned above, the lease maturity itself cannot capture the whole value of lease contract. The argument in Giambona, et al. 2008 holds only in an up market, but not necessarily in a down market because of the di¢ culty of re-leasing the space.
Most asset managers believe that the property is only as strong as the tenant (Smith, 2009 Therefore, the quality of lease contracts depends on the credit quality of the tenants. A tenant with better …nancial stability implies less counterparty risk, which means higher asset quality. We measure asset quality with the revenue-weighted Altman Z-score, which we construct using the historical performance of assets, liabilities, and earnings to predict a …rm's probability of default.
To construct such a measure, we focus on the top tenants that provide at least 60 percent of the landlord …rm's revenue and match all publicly traded tenants to Compustat. We calculate an average tenant Altman Z-score weighted by the percentage contribution of revenue of each tenant for every REIT …rm in our sample.
Thus, our …rst hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis I: A REIT with higher average tenant Z-scores has higher asset quality and higher liquidation value. Therefore, a REIT with higher average tenant Z-scores tends to …nance with debt.
Industry Concentration of Local Markets
One key problem with illiquid assets like real estate is that a hasty liquidation may cause signi…cant private costs to the owner. When a …nancially constrained real estate …rm wants to sell a property in a highly concentrated real estate market, it is likely that potential buyers are in similar …nancial distress. Consistent with this argument, real estate appraisers typically assume that a rapid sale of real estate leads to a liquidation discount (or …re-sale discount), since redeployment of the …rm's assets is di¢ cult. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) In our model, we capture such a liquidation discount by , which represents an immediate drop in the generated cash ‡ows at the time of liquidation. Based on Equations (3) and (5),
Therefore, our model predicts a negative e¤ect of the liquidation discount on the normalized liquidation value.
In our analysis, we measure the liquidation discount using the average industry con- tenants in a space. In a long-run market equilibrium, the zoning restriction and the local economic base should be integrated in a region that provides a unique industry structure.
Therefore the industry concentration structure captures the long-run attractiveness of a market.
To construct such a proxy we …rst obtain the top ten markets for each REIT. Following Hirschman (1964) , for each MSA we calculate a Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), HHI =
where E i is the number of employees in each industry category of a particular MSA.
A higher HHI means a higher industry concentration. Doing so makes it possible for us to measure the extent of local real estate market diversi…cation and industry concentration. If the labor force is wholly concentrated in a single industry, then the index is one. With the revenue-weighted average of the local market HHI as a proxy for …re-sale discount, we have our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis II: A lower industry concentration for a REIT's property markets is associated with higher asset liquidation values. Therefore, …rms with lower average industry concentration ratios are more likely to …nance with debt.
Market Indicators of Firm' s Liquidation Value
We also test our hypotheses by using two market measures, the realized loss severity rate on securitized commercial mortgages and the …rm-level cap rate. If the market is more or less e¢ cient, some of the information about asset quality and attractiveness of real estate markets should be priced in realized liquidations and the cash ‡ow valuation matrix.
Loss Severity Rate
We can also infer the asset liquidation value from realized foreclosures. Assuming that the historical liquidations indicate future performance, we use the realized loss severity rate 3 of publicly traded commercial mortgage backed security (CMBS) as a proxy of REITs'asset liquidation value.
We note that there may be some di¤erence in liquidation values between properties collateralized in portfolio loans compared to those securitized in CMBS deals. However, the loss severity rates extracted in CMBS deals still provide a useful market measure for liquidation value across property types and over time. Thus, as a measure of loss severity, we exploit the average loss severity by property type from foreclosed real assets in securitized CMBS deals, provided by the U.S. structured products research of LehmanLive 4 . We build a realized CMBS loss severity indicator for each REIT according to its real asset exposure to test our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis III: A lower realized CMBS loss severity rate of a REIT indicates higher asset liquidation value. Therefore, …rms with lower realized CMBS loss severity are more likely to …nance with debt ex-ante.
Cap Rate
Our second market measure for asset liquidation value focuses on cash ‡ow valuation and We derive the relation between the cap rate and normalized liquidation value from the model framework presented in Section 1. We de…ne the cap rate C as the net operating cash ‡ow, I, divided by the market value of an asset, V 0 :
Solving for L, we obtain
Therefore, our model predicts that a higher cap rate is associated with a lower normalized liquidation value. In contrast to the historical market proxy that uses the realized CMBS loss severity rate, the cap rate measures forward-looking capital market pricing. If investors are rational, with …xed next year net income, the price (V 0 ) they are paying should re ‡ect the intrinsic value of asset quality and local market information.
We use a panel data of cap rates across time and property types from RealtyRates.com. 6 We compute an average cap rate based on property weights in various locations and property types. Hence, our …nal hypothesis is Hypothesis IV: A lower capitalization rate indicates a higher asset liquidation value for the same set of cash ‡ows. Therefore, …rms with lower average capitalization rate measures are more likely to …nance with debt. 5 Divide both sides of (4) by V 0 , we get 1 = C+ L r+ , from which the normalized liquidation value is derived. 6 Regression using cap rates from Real Capital Analytics or PWC Korpacz yields similar results.
3 Sample Data and Descriptive Analysis
The variable of interest is the choice of incremental …nancing, i.e., debt or equity. The data on REITs'incremental …nancing decisions are from SNL Real Estate, which covers all equity REITs' public security o¤erings from January 2000 through December 2009. SNL Real Estate provides detailed information on REIT investments, …rm …nancial characteristics, as well as information on geographical distribution of properties and tenant exposures; most of this information is not available on Compustat.
There are 2,150 new issues, including 921 bond issues and 1,229 equity issues from 183 REITs during the 2000-2009 period. We derive accounting information, such as total book assets, total debt, and returns on average assets, from Compustat, complemented when necessary by SNL Real Estate. Among the four ingredients of our liquidation value measures, the key factor is tenant quality. However, since some properties (e.g., hotels and apartments) do not have corporate tenants whose stock is publicly traded, we use the following three sample selection criteria:
Criteria 1 : We remove observations if any one of the four liquidation measures is missing.
This criterion results in 863 observations. Criteria 2 : From the sample screened from criterion 1, we add properties that are run by an operating company, 7 or are mixed use. We believe that for hotels, apartments, and other property types with transient tenants, a property managed by a more e¢ cient operator should have higher asset quality. Therefore we use an operator's quality to represent tenant quality. Criterion 2 generates 1,043 observations. Criteria 3: From the sample generated using criterion 2, we add observations that have one of two market measures for liquidation value, either the cap rate or the loss severity. The sample that contains the cap rate comprises 1,448 observations. The sample that contains the loss severity has 1,300 observations.
We use the sample generated from criterion 2 of 1,043 observations for our baseline regression. We use the samples produced from criteria 1 and 3 for robustness checks. The baseline regression sample contains 1,043 new o¤erings, which consist of 484 bond issues and 559 equity issues from 102 REITs. On average, there is one issue per …rm per year.
[Put Table1 here] [Put Table 3 here]
The four panels in Table 3 of liquidation value, the hotel sector has the highest cap rate and highest loss severity. It is consistent with the industry consensus that hotels are the riskiest asset class due to the lack of long-term tenants (e.g., many rent rooms for just one night). Apartments appear to have the lowest cap rate and loss severity.
Empirical Analysis
Based on the model of REIT liquidation value presented in Section 1 and empirical speci…cations of liquidation measures presented in Section 2, we test our four hypotheses by using multivariate logit regressions. Furthermore, we control for the common determinants of capital structure.
Controlling Competitive Explanations
To conduct our formal regression analysis, we control for determinants of …nancing choice that are commonly used in the capital structure literature: the e¤ects of the trade-o¤ theory (leverage ratio), the pecking order theory (pro…tability, growth opportunity), the market timing theory (market-to-book ratio), and signaling (dilution). Fixed costs associated with a new debt issue are lower for large …rms, which makes debt …nancing more appealing to them. Therefore, we control for variables such as …rm size, measured as the logarithm of a …rm's book assets. We also consider alternative measures of these control variables for our robustness checks.
Trade-o¤ theory
The trade-o¤ theory, …rst proposed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) , hypothesizes that …rms weigh the bene…ts (e.g., tax savings) against the costs (e.g., deadweight bankruptcy costs) of debt, i.e., …rms design each incremental …nancing activity to adjust their overall leverage ratios towards optimal target levels. Hence, they can gradually eliminate the devi- 
Pecking order theory
Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order theory states that when facing …nancing needs, …rms prioritize their sources of …nancing. Internal funds are used …rst, and when those funds are depleted, the …rm issues debt. When the debt capacity is reached, the …rm issues equity.
Because pro…table …rms have a …nancial surplus, the pecking order theory predicts an inverse relation between pro…tability and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Fama and French, 2002) . Pro…table …rms mainly use internal …nancing when necessary; hence their use of external sources of …nancing is low. The negative association between pro…tability and leverage that supports the pecking order theory has been empirically documented by Myers (1984) , Baskin (1989) , Friend and Lang (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) .
To control for the inverse relation between the pro…tability and leverage ratio, we include a measure of pro…tability, the return on average assets (ROAA). We also control for a …rm's growth, which we measure as the growth rate of funds from operations (FFO). The FFO is a measure of REITs'operating performance that is calculated by adding depreciation and amortization expenses to earnings. FFO gives us a clearer idea of a REIT's cash performance, which is a better measure of the REIT's performance than is earnings.
Market timing theory
Baker and Wurgler (2002) explore the managers'practice of timing the equity market, and …nd evidence for this policy. They demonstrate that market timing implies that not only does the market-to-book ratio a¤ect capital structure through equity issues, but also that the negative e¤ect is persistent and helps to explain the cross-sectional variation in leverage.
These e¤ects cannot be explained by capital structure theories. We include the market-tobook ratio to control for the market timing e¤ect.
Signaling
In the pecking order model, good-quality …rms use internal funds to avoid the adverse selection problem and the loss of value. However, these …rms are not able to signal their quality by using capital structure. Another strand of capital structure theory proposed by Ross (1977) posits that capital structure serves as a signal of private information. Ross's argu-ment is that equity issuance signals that the stock is overpriced. To avoid such a signaling e¤ect, companies with major …nancing needs tend to prefer debt.
To control for the signaling e¤ect, we include dilution as a control variable. We compute dilution as the total amount of new issues divided by total market cap one quarter prior to the security o¤ering (Asquith and Mullins, 1986) . Table 4 summarizes the predicted e¤ects on the …rm's …nancing decisions.
[Put Table 4 here]
The Results
We use a univariate analysis to investigate the e¤ect of liquidation value on …nancing choice. [Put Table 5 here]
The Pearson correlation matrix reported in Table 6 show that the correlations between these explanatory variables is moderate at best; most of the correlations are low for our primary variables of interests, especially tenant quality. For example, the correlations between tenant quality and the controls for alternative capital structure theories (leverage, pro…tability, market-to-book, dilution, FFO growth, and size) are within 8%.The evidence supports our claim that tenant quality is a better proxy for liquidation value. The correlation between MSA industry concentration and tenant quality is -0.08, which supports our empirical method of jointly testing short-and long-run measures of asset liquidation value.
The correlation between tenant quality and the cap rate and loss severity are -0.20 and -0.13, respectively. This result is not surprising, since the capital market captures some of information conveyed from intrinsic measures of asset quality.
[Put Table 6 here]
In Table 7 , we compare the distributions of asset liquidation value measures and other explanatory variables and test for signi…cant di¤erences between debt o¤erings and equity o¤erings. The results suggest that on average, relative to REITs that issue equity, REITs that raise funds by issuing bonds have a larger market capitalization, lower current market leverage ratios, lower FFO growth, smaller o¤ering amounts relative to the value of book assets, and higher market-to-book ratios.
[Put Table 7 here]
Multivariate Logit Analysis
We use multivariate logit regression analysis as our primary tool to study the choice of new security issuance. We set the dependent variable to one for bond issues and zero for equity issues. We measure the liquidation value with four di¤erent variables: the average tenant Z-scores, the industry concentration of top markets in which the REIT operates, the …rm's capitalization rate, and the …rm's loss severity from historical CMBS liquidation. According to our theoretical model, we expect a positive loading on the tenant quality and negative loadings on the other three measures.
Our control variables include the current market leverage ratio (Leverage), the return on average assets (Pro…tability), the market-to-book ratio, the o¤ering amount divided by the market cap (Dilution), the growth rate of funds from operations (FFO growth), and logarithm of …rm's book asset (…rm size). Our empirical evidence, which is consistent across all four measures of liquidation value, supports the Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesis.
Firms that issue bonds not only have higher quality tenants (Z-scores) but also hold assets in real estate markets that tend to have a more diverse mix of industries in a location relative to the industry concentration associated with equity-o¤ering …rms. The relation is reversed for the capitalization rate and the historical loss severity. These results suggest that higher expected liquidation values are associated with a higher likelihood of bond issues relative to 20 equity issues. The e¤ect is signi…cant from both statistical and economic perspectives. A one-standard-deviation increase in the tenant quality is associated with a 5% to 7% higher probability of issuing debt. The probability increases are about 5% and 3% for a onestandard-deviation decrease in the cap rate and the loss severity rate, respectively.
[Put Table 8 here] The column "Change in Prob"in model 1, which computes the change in probability of issuing debt for a one-standard-deviation increase in a corresponding variable, also shows the economic signi…cance. A one-standard-deviation increase (decrease) in the tenant average Z-score (industry concentration ratio of REIT's top markets) is associated with a 5% (6%) higher probability that a …rm will issue debt. In addition, the …rm's characteristics also play an important role in its …nancing decisions. Larger …rms are more likely to issue debt.
In Model 2 we include the average lease maturity as an additional control. Given tenant quality, the lease maturity has no e¤ect on a …rm's …nancing choice, which veri…es our hypothesis that lease maturity is endogenously determined.
Model 3 further controls for alternative capital structure theories. Our results are consistent with the trade-o¤, pecking order, and signaling theories of capital structure. The market leverage prior to a new security issue has a signi…cant negative impact on the use of bonds. This …nding is consistent with the trade-o¤ theory. Our estimates suggest that given a one-standard-deviation increase in market leverage, on average a …rm is 15% less likely to issue bonds. Consistent with the pecking order theory, there is a negative relation between debt …nancing and the FFO growth or pro…tability ratio. Our estimates are also consistent with the signaling hypothesis, under which the …rm's likelihood of issuing debt increases by 5% if the dilution measure increases by one standard deviation. Conditional on these four theories, our proxies for asset liquidation value remain signi…cant on both a statistical and economical basis.
[Put Table 9 here]
Using the …rm-level cap rate and loss severity rate as explanatory variables, in models 4 and 5 in Table 9 we test the e¤ects of …nancing choice by using each of the two market measures of liquidation value separately. Given proxies for trade-o¤, pecking order, market timing, and signaling theory, the …rm's market measures of asset liquidation value remain signi…cant. A one-standard-deviation increase in the …rm's cap rate (loss severity rate) is associated with a 5% (3%) decrease in the probability of issuing debt.
Robustness Checks
To check if tenant quality is a main driver of asset liquidation value, which in turn determines a …rm's …nancing choice, we perform several robustness tests. We …rst check the model speci…cations 1, 2, and 3 with a tighter sample under sample selection criterion 1. Table   10 shows that the results are consistent with those in Table 8 . Tenant quality remains a signi…cant driver of a …rm's …nancing choice in this sample, which comprises 863 observations.
Other control variables have similar results, except for the dilution factor, which becomes nonsigni…cant. The overall …t improves for model 3. Although the sample size is reduced by 17%, with the same number of regressors the pseudo R 2 increases from 19.7% (Table 8 Model 3) to 21.1% (Table 10 Model 3).
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[Put Table 10 here]
In Table 11 we examine the model speci…cations 4 and 5 with a larger sample under selection criterion 3. The sample, which comprises 1,448 (1,300) observations, contains all security o¤erings, in which we can compute both the cap rate (loss severity) and other control variables. The two samples are much larger than those in the baseline regression (Table 9 , models 4 and 5), but the results are consistent with the baseline results. A one-standarddeviation decrease in the cap rate (loss severity rate) is associated with a 4% (5%) increase in the probability of issuing debt. The results become statistically signi…cant at the 1% level.
[ Put table 11 here]
In Table 12 we explore the …nancing decision of …rms such as hotels, apartments, selfstorage, etc. that do not have long-term tenants. Without tenant information, an intrinsic measure of asset liquidation value is not possible. We compare the …nancing e¤ects of market measures of liquidation value derived from the cap rate and the loss severity rate. Model 4 in Table 12 shows that the cap rate is signi…cant and negatively associated with the probability of issuing debt. A one-standard-deviation decrease in the cap rate implies a 9% higher probability of issuing debt. This sensitivity is almost twice as large as the magnitude in the baseline sample. Table 12 shows that a one-standard deviation decrease in the loss severity measure is associated with a 16% higher probability of issuing debt. This sensitivity is more than …ve times as large as the magnitude in the baseline regression.
Model 5 in the
The results in the Table 12 indicate that when we cannot directly observe the intrinsic measures of asset quality, the …rm's …nancing choice relies more heavily on market indicators.
If we interpret the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of the cap rate (or loss severity rate) as the sensitivity of the …rm's …nancing choice to market indicators, then the sensitivities are two to …ve times as large as those that have an intrinsic (or direct) measure of the …rm's asset liquidation value.
[Put Table 12 here]
The results in Table 8 to Table 12 show that, overall, our results are robust to model speci…cations. Both intrinsic and market measures of liquidation value have a signi…cant impact on a …rm's …nancing choice.
Conclusion
To test the Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesis that the asset liquidation value in ‡uences a …rm's …nancing choices, we focus on asset quality. The real estate industry provides an ideal setting to test the cross-sectional patterns of …rms'…nancing choices, since the value of real assets is relatively easier to identify and measure. In this setting, asset quality not only encompasses the quality of the tenants who occupy the building, but also the location quality of an area. To determine location quality we use its economic base (mixture of various industries) as a proxy, since real estate is …xed in location and the health of the local economy in ‡uences the cash ‡ow of the tenants. Our tenant quality measure re ‡ects the asset quality from a shorter-term perspective. Since our metric of industry concentration (economic base) within local markets captures the long-term redeployability notion of Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005), we essentially control for such long-term equilibrium vis-à-vis the industry concentration.
We construct a valuation model to determine the factors that should in ‡uence liquidation value and …nancing choice. We then test whether our model predicts the observed choices that …rms make in terms of their choice to issue debt or equity. We …nd that as predicted, …rms with low asset liquidation values are less likely to issue debt to raise additional funds.
When controlling for traditional factors that explain …rm …nancing decision, we still …nd signi…cant evidence that supports Shleifer and Vishny's hypothesis. Asset quality is an important determinant of both liquidation value and debt capacity. Firms that issue debt not only have higher quality tenants, but also hold assets in geographical markets that have a more diverse mix of industries relative to …rms that issue equity. For …rms such as hotels, apartments and self-storage, whose assets are not occupied by long-term tenants we cannot easily observe the fundamental measures of asset quality. The …rm's …nancing choices rely more heavily on the overall real asset market conditions in these situations.
Appendix: Model with Cash Flow Growth
In Section 1, we assume that the …rm generates a constant cash ‡ow. We extend the basic model by introducing cash ‡ow growth. Under the cash ‡ow growth model, we prove that the negative relation between the capitalization rate and …rm's liquidation value remains true.
Assuming the …rm's cash ‡ow grows at a constant rate g, then Equations (1) and (2) become
and
which lead Equations (3) and (4) to
Plugging in cap rate C = I V 0
; the normalized …rm liquidation value becomes
It is straightforward to show @L @C < 0;which con…rms the Section 1's prediction of a negative relation between the cap rate and …rm's liquidation value. This table presents the multivariate logit regression results we obtain for REITs'incremental …nanc-ing decisions. Our sample comprises 1,043 observations selected under sample selection criterion 2. We include additional observations if REIT properties are managed by a public operator or have mixed use. The dependent variable is set to one for a new bond issue, and zero for an equity issue. We measure liquidation value by the industry concentration ratio of REIT top markets and the revenue-weighted average Altman Z-score of major tenants. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total market assets, where we de…ne market assets as the total book assets plus the di¤erence between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. The growth rate of funds from operations (FFO Growth) is the annual percentage change in such funds. Dilution is the total amount of o¤ering divided by the market cap prior to the new issue. We measure pro…tability by the return on average assets (ROAA). Market-to-book is the total book assets divided by the total market value of assets. Z-statistics are shown in the line below the coe¢ cient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. We measure liquidation value separately by using the self-constructed …rm level capitalization rate and …rm level realized loss severity rate. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total market assets, where we de…ne market assets as the total book assets plus the di¤erence between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. Funds from operations (FFO) growth is the annual percentage change in such funds. Dilution is the total amount of the o¤ering divided by the market cap prior to the new issue. We measure pro…tability by the return on average assets (ROAA). Market-to-book is the total book assets divided by the total market value of assets. Z-statistics are shown below the coe¢ cient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents the multivariate logit regression results of REITs' incremental …nancing decisions for a sample of 863 observations selected under sample selection criterion 1. We remove observations if any one of the four liquidation measures is missing. The dependent variable is set to one for a new bond issue, and zero for an equity issue. We measure liquidation value by the industry concentration ratio of REIT top markets and revenue-weighted average Altman Z-score of major tenants. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total market assets, where we de…ne market assets as the total book assets plus the di¤erence between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. Funds from operations (FFO) growth is the annual percentage change in such funds. Dilution is the total amount of o¤ering divided by the market cap prior to the new issue. We measure pro…tability by the return on average assets (ROAA). Market-to-book is the total book assets divided by the total market value of assets. Z-statistics are shown in the line below the coe¢ cient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents the multivariate logit regression results of REITs'incremental …nancing decisions for a sample selected under sample selection criterion 3. We include observations if any one of the two market measures for liquidation value are available. Criteria 3 generates 1,448 (1,300) observations for the capitalization rate (loss severity rate) sample. The dependent variable is set to one for a new bond issue, and zero for an equity issue. We measure liquidation value separately by the self-constructed …rm level capitalization rate and …rm level realized loss severity rate. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total market assets, where we de…ne market assets as the total book assets plus the di¤erence between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. Funds from operations (FFO) growth is the annual percentage change in such funds. Dilution is the total amount of o¤ering divided by the market cap prior to the new issue. We measure pro…tability by the return on average assets (ROAA). Market-to-book is the total book assets divided by the total market value of assets. Z-statistics are shown in the line below the coe¢ cient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total market assets, where we de…ne market assets as the total book assets plus the di¤erence between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. Funds from operations (FFO) growth is the annual percentage change in such funds. Dilution is the total amount of o¤ering divided by the market cap prior to the new issue. We measure pro…tability by the return on average assets (ROAA). Market-to-book is the total book assets divided by the total market value of assets. Z-statistics are shown in the line below the coe¢ cient. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
